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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Decentralisation is associated with the hope that “bringing government closer to the 
people”  will  improve  the  provision  of  public  services  by  increasing  people’s  voice  in 
decision-making,  and  by  making  the  government  more  accountable  to  them. 
Decentralisation  is  also  associated  with  the  hope  that  disadvantaged  groups  of  society, 
including the poor and women, will have better possibilities to exercise voice at the local 
level. Some countries have combined decentralisation with affirmative action, for example, 
by reserving seats in local councils for women and other disadvantaged groups. Yet the 
empirical  evidence  regarding  the  impacts  of  decentralisation  has  been  mixed  [Bardhan 
(2002); von Braun and Grote (2002); Jütting, et al. (2004); Steiner (2005)]. In many cases, 
political  decentralisation  has  not  been  associated  with  fiscal  and  administrative 
decentralisation,  thus  limiting  the  scope  of  what  local  governments  can  actually  do. 
Building capacity at the local level and overcoming coordination problems has been another 
challenge.  Local elite capture has been identified as a  major problem that can prevent 
positive effects of decentralisation for the poor, especially in societies with hierarchical 
power  structures  at  the  local  level  [Bardhan  (2002)].  With  regard  to  gender,  there  are 
concerns  that  decentralisation—even  if  associated  with  affirmative  action—will  not  be 
sufficient to overcome gender-based discrimination. Again, the empirical evidence is mixed 
[ADB (2004)]. Chatthobadhay and Duflo (2004) found that that women who were elected 
as village leaders under the reservation policy in the Indian states of West Bengal and 
Rajastan  invested  more  in  those  public  goods  that  more  closely  linked  to  women’s 
concerns, such as drinking water. Baden (1999) showed that it depends on local power 
structures and on the availability and competition over resources whether or not women 
benefit  from  decentralisation.  In  view  of  the  mixed  results,  important  knowledge  gaps 
remain regarding the possibilities to promote public service provision for the poor and for 
women through political decentralisation and associated affirmative action. 
This paper examines one major mechanism by which decentralisation can help to 
improve public service provision for the poor and for women: voting. Three questions are 
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addressed in this paper: (1) To what extent do the poor and to which extent do women 
use their vote in local government elections to exercise voice regarding public service 
provision? (2) Which factors influence their decisions to make use of this mechanism? 
and  (3)  What  are  the  constraints  faced  by  elected  council  members  to  represent  the 
interests of poor constituencies and of  women in local  governments? The analysis is 
based  on  a  voter  and  candidate  survey,  which  the  Pattan  Development  Foundation 
conducted  before  and  after  the  2005  Local  Government  elections  in  Pakistan  [Pattan 
2006).  
Pakistan presents an interesting case for analysing local government elections. The 
country  engaged  in  a  far-reaching  decentralisation  process  in  2001.  The  hopes  that 
decentralisation will improve public service provision have been particularly pronounced, 
because other strategies to reach that goal had limited success. In fact, Pakistan’s track 
record  of  public  service  provision  has  been  rather  poor  prior  to  decentralisation 
[ADB/DFID/World  Bank  (2004)].  As  an  indication,  growth  in  Pakistan  had  been 
associated  with  fewer  improvements  in  health  and  education  outcomes  than  in 
comparable  developing  countries.  The  female-male  literacy  gap  in  Pakistan  even 
increased with economic growth while it declined in comparable countries. Likewise, 
infant mortality declined at a much lower rate in Pakistan than in comparable countries. 
Moreover, the link between increased funding and improvements service provision was 
weak as compared to other countries. Thus, neither growth nor increased public spending 
was likely to improve rural service provision [ADB/DFID/World Bank (2004)]. Against 
this background, the decentralisation reforms hold considerable promise to address to 
overcome the long-standing problems of public service provision in Pakistan.  
Voting  is  obviously  only  one  step  in  an  impact  chain  that  links  political 
decentralisation with pro-poor public service provision and gender equity. However, it is 
an essential step, and—in fact—the major mechanism by which political decentralisation 
can be expected to lead to improved outcomes. Hence, a better empirical understanding 
of this mechanism, and the factors that influence how well it works for the poor and for 
women is an important element in assessing the success of decentralisation reforms.  
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 of presents a conceptual framework 
that  maps  the  mechanisms  that  are  essential  for  achieving  improved  public  service 
provision through decentralisation and locates the role of voting in this context. Section 2 
also describes the decentralisation reform in Pakistan in terms of this framework. Section 
3 presents the results of the empirical analysis, and Section 4 concludes. 
 
2.  DECENTRALISATION AND PUBLIC SERVICE PROVISION 
 
2.1.  Conceptual Framework 
Figure 1 presents a conceptual framework that maps the mechanisms by which 
decentralisation can improve the performance of public service provision. Major public 
services in the provision of which local governments could become involved include, 
among others, water and sanitation, basic health and education, agricultural advisory and 
veterinary services, irrigation management and forestry. Likewise, decentralisation may 
shift  responsibilities  for  the  provision  of  rural  infrastructure,  such  as  roads,  to  local Decentralisation for the Poor and for Women  1347 
governments.  Performance  of  service  provision  can  be  measured  by  using  service-
specific indicators, which capture (a) the quality of the services provided, (b) the access 
of different groups of society to these services, and (c) the efficiency of service provision. 
As  Figure  1  (see  box  at  the  right-hand  side  of  the  diagram)  indicates,  improved 
performance  and  gender  equity  in  public  service  provision  can  be  considered  as  an 
important factor in influencing overall development outcomes. To analyse the factors that 
influence the performance of public service provision, it is useful to distinguish between 
(a) the capacity and the incentives of the service providers to finance and supply these 
services to the poor in a gender-equitable way (supply-side factors), and (b) the ability of 
citizens—independently of income  statues and gender—to demand these services and 
hold service-providers accountable (demand-side factors). As shown in Figure 1, both 
factors are influenced by the extent of political, administrative and fiscal decentralisation.  
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The term political decentralisation refers to the shift of authority to elected local 
governments.  Administrative  decentralisation  describes  the  transfer  of  administrative 
staff to local governments. Fiscal decentralisation refers to the level of authority that local 
governments  have  in  raising  revenues  and  making  autonomous  expenditure  decisions 
regarding their own revenues and regarding transfers from higher levels of government. 
Figure 1 indicates that next to decentralisation, there are other approaches that can 
contribute  to  improved  public  service  provision.  On  the  demand-side,  measures  to 
increase voice and accountability may include affirmative action, such as the reservation 
of  seats  for  women  and  other  disadvantaged  groups  in  local  councils,  as  mentioned 
above.  Other  demand-side  measures  include  participatory  planning  methods,  social Birner, Qureshi, Akramov, and Khan  1348 
auditing and the right to information. The effectiveness of these approaches depends on 
their suitability to reduce obstacles to political participation that are associated with the 
characteristics of the local population, such as the prevalence of gender discrimination 
and patron-client relationships (“good fit” link in Figure 1).  
On  the  supply  side,  measures  that  can  accompany  fiscal  and  administrative 
decentralisation  may  include  civil  service  reforms,  improved  systems  of  public 
expenditure  management,  outsourcing  of  service  provision,  and  public-private 
partnerships. Specific measures to address problems of inequity and social exclusion may 
include training and awareness creation among the staff of service providers. According 
to the theory of representative bureaucracy, increasing the percentage of female staff and 
staff representing poor and disadvantaged groups may also help. The effectiveness of 
these approaches depends on the extent to which they are able to address the specific 
problems  that  account  for  low  performance  and  social  exclusion  of  public  service 
provision (“good fit” link in Figure 1). 
This framework indicates that voting is an essential factor, though not the only 
factor, by which the poor and disadvantaged groups can exercise demand for a better and 
more inclusive public service provision. Voting is also a major factor by which citizens 
can hold public service providers accountable. However, voice and accountability will 
only  lead  to  better  service  provision,  if  the  public  administration  has  the  capacity  to 
improve service provision. Hence, one can hypothesise that the perception of citizens 
regarding this capacity has an influence on their willingness to vote, and to consider 
service provision on their voting behaviour. The framework suggests that characteristics 
of the local communities, for example, the extent to which they consider it appropriate for 
women to make their own decisions regarding voting, also influences voting behaviour.  
 
2.2.  Supply- and Demand-side Approaches to Pakistan’s  
Devolution of Power Policy 
The decentralisation reforms that the Musharraf government announced in 2000 
(“Devolution of Power” Plan) and enacted with the Local Government Ordinance in 2001 
entail  both  demand-side  and  supply-side  measures.  A  three-tier  local  government 
structure  was  created,  consisting  of  the  Union,  Tehsil  and  District  level.  There  is  an 
elected council at each level, which is headed by a Nazim. The electorate for the union 
councils comprises all registered voters who are Pakistani citizens and 18 years or older. 
They directly elect the Union Council members and the Union Nazim on a non-party 
basis. The elections for the Tehsil and District-level council members and Nazims are 
indirect. These bodies are elected by the Union Council members. An important demand-
side measure is the reservation of 33 percent of seats for women in all tiers of local 
government.  Seats  are  also  reserved  for  peasants  and  workers.  The  government  also 
introduced other demand-side measures, such as social audits [Saleem (2006)]. 
Elected local governments existed prior to the devolution in 2001, but they did not 
play  any  significant  role,  as  they  were  practically  inactive,  especially  in  rural  areas 
[Cheema,  et  al.  (2004)].  Most  state  functions  were  carried  out  by  the  Provincial 
administration.  As  a  supply-side  measure,  the  devolution  policy  transferred  the 
responsibility for most public services that were previously under the local provincial 
administration  to  the  local  governments.  This  administrative  decentralisation  process Decentralisation for the Poor and for Women  1349 
was,  however,  not  uniform  across  all  functions,  with  significant  heterogeneity  in  its 
extent across different administrative departments and across different services within a 
department. As an important measure to create accountability, the bureaucracy is now 
responsible  to  elected  heads  of  local  government  at  all  three  levels.  In  the  previous 
system, the Deputy Commissioner—a key figure in local government—used to report to 
the  non-elected  provincial  bureaucracy.  Fiscal  decentralisation,  another  supply-side 
measure, was promoted, as well. The expenditure budget share of local governments in 
aggregate provincial and local government spending increased from approximately 10 to 
30 percent [Cheema, et al. (2004), p. 35]. The financial transfers to local governments are 
based on a formula, which takes population and backwardness into account. 
  
3.  EVIDENCE FROM THE 2005 LOCAL  
GOVERNMENT ELECTIONS 
 
3.1.  Data and Methods 
The results presented here are based on a pre-election and a post-election voter and 
candidate survey of the 2005 Local Government Elections, the second round of elections since 
the 2001 devolution was enacted. The survey was conducted by the Pattan Development 
Organisation [Pattan (2006)]. The sample size was 3,792. A three-stage sampling procedure 
was used. At the first stage, 59 districts were sampled with their probability proportionate to 
their size. At the second stage, districts were stratified according to urban and rural locations. 
At the third stage, the respondents were selected from the voter list, using a random start 
number and the random walk method. Due to the low population density in Balochistan, a 
booster  sample  was  drawn  for  this  province.  For  the  analysis,  the  sample  was  weighted 
accordingly [Pattan (2006), p. 7]. Pattan also conducted a pre- and post-election survey of the 
Union councilors to cover the indirect elections. This paper presents descriptive statistics 
derived from survey, focusing on a comparison of the results by poverty groups and by 
gender. Thus, the paper provides a basis for subsequent studies, which will employ analytical 
statistics, such as logistic and multi-level models [Akramov, et al. (2007)]. 
 
3.2.  Poverty Status of Respondents 
In order to analyse to which extent the poor use their vote as voice, it is necessary to 
disaggregate the survey data by poverty groups. The voter survey featured two questions, 
from which the poverty status of the respondent can be derived. One question referred to the 
monthly income of the household. As this question is difficult to answer for respondents that 
do not receive a monthly wage, such as farmers, the prevalence of missing data is rather high 
(13.5 percent). The second question grouped the respondents into the categories described in 
Table 1. Approximately half of the respondents reported that they have only enough income 
to provide adequate food and shelter for the family (Category 2 in Table 1).  
Considering official poverty figures, one can assume that more people opted for 
this category than would actually classify. In view of the high level of missing data for 
the question on monthly income, the categories of Table 1 are nevertheless used as a 
basis for the analysis. Three groups are distinguished: (1) “very poor” (food insecure), 
corresponding to Category 1 in Table 1, (2) “poor/medium” (Category 2 in Table 1), and 
(3) ‘better-off” (Categories 3, 4, and 5 in Table 1 combined). Birner, Qureshi, Akramov, and Khan  1350 
Table 1 
Poverty Groups in Post-election Voter Survey 
Question: There are several ways to describe a household’s 
financial situation.  Please tell me which of these statements 




1.  We sometimes do not have enough income to eat three 
meals a day  12.1  2,750 
2.  We have enough income only to provide adequate food 
and shelter for the family  50.5  4,680 
3.  We have enough income to  provide food and shelter 
and to buy new clothing from time to time  25.9  9,260 
4.  We  have  money  left  over  from  time  to  time  after 
meeting our basic needs  8.2  12,790 
5.  We  always  have  money  left  over  after  meeting  our 
basic needs  2.6  25,230 
  Missing  0.6  – 
Source:  Pattan (2006) Post-Election Survey of voters. 
 *Reported  monthly  family  income  in  Rs  In  2005,  the  poverty  line  was  approx.  Rs  930  per  adult 
household member per month. The survey asked for the number of children below age 15, but not for 
the entire household size. Hence, it is difficult to compare the reported average monthly income of the 
household with the poverty line. 
 
3.3.  The Decision to Vote 
As  stated  above, participation  in  local  government  elections  is a  necessary, 
though not a sufficient condition, to be able to use the right to vote as a mechanism 
to exercise voice regarding public service provision and to hold local governments 
accountable. According to the official figures of the National Election Commission, 
voter turnout in the Local Government Elections declined from 52.3 percent in the 
2001  elections  to 47.4  percent  in  the  2005  elections  [ECP (2005)].  Voter  turnout 
reported  in  post-election  surveys  is  usually  higher  than  the  actual  voter  turnout, 
because respondents often feel a responsibility to vote and give an expected answer. 
This was also the case in the Pattan survey, in which the reported voter turnout was 
56.5 percent. Table 2 compares the figures from the Election Commission and the 
Pattan survey by Province and gender. The highest difference (16 percent) in voter 
turnout between the Election Commission data and the Pattan data was observed for 
Balochistan. Still, the differences seem modest and do not suggest a major bias in the 
data used for this study. 
Table 2 shows that  women’s voter turnout was considerably lower than men’s 
voter turnout in all Provinces. The difference  was particularly pronounced in NWFP, 
followed by Sindh. At the national level, 39.5 percent of the women voted, as compared 
to 56.8  percent of the men. Decentralisation for the Poor and for Women  1351 
Table 2 
Voter Turnout by Gender and Province 
  Election Commission  Pattan Survey 
  Male  Female  Total  Male  Female  Total 
Punjab  61.5  44.0  53.5  68.6  55.2  62.2 
Sindh  47.6  24.3  37.6  57.9  37.1  50.3 
NWFP  57.4  21.1  41.2  72.7  26.6  48.1 
Balochistan  39.3  21.5  31.1  52.7  41.5  47.4 
Total  56.8  35.9  47.4  65.8  46.3  56.2 
Sources: ECP (2005), Pattan (2006): Post-election voters’ survey. 
 
Table 3 shows voter turnout by income group. In NWFP, only 22 percent of the 
very  poor  respondents  voted,  as  compared  to  more  than  60  percent  of  the  better-off 
respondents. However, in the other Provinces, voter turnout among the very poor was 
comparable or even higher than that in the other income categories. 
 
Table 3 
Voter Turnout by Income Group and Province 
 
Very Poor  
(Food Insecure)  Poor/Medium  Better-off 
Punjab  59.0  61.8  63.9 
NWFP  22.1  45.0  66.2 
Sindh  58.3  52.5  41.3 
Balochistan  52.3  42.3  51.6 
Total  55.8  56.1  57.2 
Source: Pattan (2006) Post-election voters’ survey. 
  
Table 4 displays the voter turnout for location, age group, literacy and education, 
disaggregated by gender. The data indicate that both men and women in rural areas were 
more  willing  to  vote  than  people  in  urban  areas.  A  higher  percentage  of  small  and 
medium-sized farmers voted than any other occupational category. Voter turnout was 
higher among illiterate men and women than among literate ones.  
Participation  increased  with  age,  both  among  men  and  women.  Among  the 
different  professional  groups,  the  largest  difference  in  male  and  female  voting 
behaviour was observed among professionals. The percentage of professional women 
who voted was particularly low. Answering the question “In your opinion, did the 
results of  the  recent  local government  elections  accurately  reflect  the  way  people 
voted or do you think there was rigging?”, 52  percent of the respondents felt that the 
elections reflected the way that people voted, 25  percent were of the opinion that 
this is not the case, and the rest was undecided. Table 5 displays the differences by 
income group and gender with regard to this question. Less than half of the very poor 
and less than half of the female respondents believe that the elections reflect the way 
that people voted.  Birner, Qureshi, Akramov, and Khan  1352 
Table 4 
Voter Turnout by Category and Gender 
  Female  Male 
Location     
  Urban  39.3  57.3 
  Rural  49.7  70.2 
Age Group     
  18-20  18.3  28.0 
  21-50  49.3  68.4 
  More than 50  66.3  72.9 
Literacy     
  Literate  39.1  63.5 
  Illiterate  51.0  72.2 
Occupation     
  Self-employed Shopkeeper  46.9  63.0 
  Self-employed Business or Trade (except shop keeping)  39.3  65.1 
  Government Servant  41.4  55.9 
  Private Sector Employee  50.7  45.7 
  Manual Labour  47.1  50.6 
  Small or Medium Sized Farmer  46.9  63.6 
  Large Farmer / Landowner  48.8  48.4 
  Professionals (Doctor, Lawyer, etc.)  32.1  75.5 
  Retired  53.0  48.6 
  Housewife  34.6  – 
  Unemployed  46.7  70.3 
  Others  46.2  44.8 
Source: Pattan (2006) Post-election voters’ survey. 
 
Table 5 
Perceived Fairness of the Elections by Income Group and Gender 
  Income Group  Gender 
  Very Poor  Poor/ 
Medium 
Better-off  Female  Male 
Reflect the Way People 
Voted 
44.9  54.7  50.9  45.9  57.7 
There was Rigging  25.3  21.7  29.2  22.9  26.7 
Don’t Know  29.8  23.5  19.9  31.2  15.5 
Source:  Pattan (2006) Post-election voters’ survey. Decentralisation for the Poor and for Women  1353 
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Source: Pattan (2006) Post-election voters’ survey. 
 
Since the topic of this paper deals with performance of public service provision, it 
appears  useful  to  present  people’s  perceptions  in  this  regard.  Figure  2  displays  the 
satisfaction of the respondents with various aspects of the performance of the previous 
District Nazim (2001-2005). The figure shows that in general, satisfaction with services 
is rather low. Law and order received relatively high scores, whereas poverty alleviation 
and control of corruption received relatively low scores. This result implies that people 
do not appear to believe that the development work carried out is particularly poverty-
focused.  Interestingly,  there  were  no  major  differences  between  income  groups  and 
between men and women in regard to satisfaction with different services.  
Table 6 shows the answers to the question: “When the new union council sets 
development priorities for your area, how much attention do you think they will pay to 
the  problems  of  ordinary  people?  Only  8.7  percent  of  the  very  poor  feel  that  Union 
Councils pay a lot of attention to common people’s problems, whereas 17.5 percent of the 
better-off  respondents  feel  that  this  is  the  case.  There  are  also  gender  differences 
regarding this perception, as shown in Table 6. 
 
Table 6 
Voters Perception Whether Union Councils Take Common People’s Problem into 
Account when Setting Development Priorities* 
  Income Group  Gender 
  Very Poor   Poor/Medium  Better-off  Female  Male 
A lot  8.7  14.6  17.5  13.4  16.4 
Some  24.3  33.1  31.9  26.4  36.4 
Very Little  17.8  18.0  19.7  18.1  18.9 
None at All  28.4  20.7  18.6  27.3  14.8 
Don’t Know  19.9  13.1  11.8  14.1  13.0 
Refused  0.9  0.6  0.5  0.7  0.5 
Source:  Pattan (2006) Post-election voters’ survey. 
* The question was formulated as follows: “When the new union council sets development priorities 
for your area, how much attention do you think they will pay to the problems of ordinary people? Do 
you think they will pay a lot of attention, some attention, very little attention or no attention at all?” Birner, Qureshi, Akramov, and Khan  1354 
Table 7 displays the reasons that people gave for not voting. The table reveals 
that—to a considerable extent—the very poor and women did not vote because they did 
not have an ID card, were not registered as voters, or because their name was not in the 
electoral  list.  Around  5  percent  of  women  were  stopped  by  their  husbands.  Lack  of 
possessing an ID card was also a major reason why people could not vote.  
 
Table 7 
Reasons Not to Vote by Gender and Income Group (Percent of Respondents) 
  Income Group  Gender 






Female  Male 
Did not have ID card  40.9  35.4  21.1  38.6  19.5 
Not registered as voter  10.5  12.5  13.0  12.5  12.2 
Went to polling station but my name was 
not on the electoral list  15.6  13.2  13.9  10.6  18.1 
Went to polling station but queue too long  0.0  0.4  1.3  0.8  0.5 
No transport  0.5  0.1  0.4  0.5  – 
Stopped by community  2.1  1.8  1.5  2.9  – 
Stopped by my husband  6.8  2.8  2.4  5.3  – 
Fear of violence  0.0  0.3  0.2  –  0.6 
Too hot / bad weather  0.6  0.5  0.9  0.6  0.8 
I was out of town/village  7.7  7.8  10.9  4.4  15.4 
Had to work  2.4  4.7  5.8  3.0  7.4 
Didn’t want to cast vote  2.2  2.5  6.4  3.6  4.2 
Elections don’t matter  3.3  2.4  4.7  3.0  4.1 
No reason in particular  2.1  3.2  6.0  4.2  3.8 
Other  5.4  11.5  10.9  9.1  12.8 
Don’t know  0.0  0.3  0.2  0.5  0.2 
Refused  0.0  0.5  0.4  0.4  0.4 
Source: Pattan (2006) Post-election voters’ survey. 
 
 
The fact that women were stopped by the community or their husbands from 
voting is related to opposition against women’s participation in elections. During the 
2001 Local Government elections, thousands of women seats were uncontested due to 
local opposition to female participation in the political system. In whole districts like 
Kohistan,  Lower  Dir  and  Battagram  in  NWFP  and  Dera  Bugti  in  Baluchistan,  no 
female candidates were allowed to contest elections following joint decisions made by 
the local leaderships of all major political parties [Qureshi (2006)]. Table 8 displays the 
percentage of respondents who answered that they oppose women’s participation in 
elections,  when  answering  the  question:  “Do  you  oppose  or  support  women’s 
participation in election?”  Decentralisation for the Poor and for Women  1355 
Table 8 
Percent of Respondents who Oppose Women’s Participation in Elections 
  Female  Male 
Location     
  Rural  19.3  19.7 
  Urban  12.9  18.4 
Education     
  Illiterate  19.5  25.7 
  Primary or Middle  15.6  19.2 
  Matric or FA/Fsc  11.1  16.4 
  More than FA/Fsc  10.8  10.9 
Age group     
  18-20  11.6  18.5 
  21-30  14.4  17.7 
  31-40  17.1  19.1 
  41-50  19.3  20.8 
  More than 50  22.8  22.0 
Source:  Pattan (2006)  Pre-election voters’ survey. 
 
The survey showed that the likelihood of opposition to female participation was 
greater in case of illiterate women and those that only passed primary school than those 
with higher educational status. The same was true for male respondents. Similarly, the 
survey established that the likelihood of opposition to women participation in elections 
increases with age.  
Another problem related to the decision to vote is the electorate’s knowledge and 
awareness regarding the voting system. This question was asked in the pre-election survey, 
which did not have a comparable poverty group classification than the post-election survey. 
Table 9 displays the results by gender. Only 9.6 percent of the female voters knew who 
would vote for Tehsil Nazims and for candidates on reserved seats for District and Tehsil 
Councils. In contrast, almost half of the men were aware of this important aspect of the 
voting system. Moreover, in percentage terms, twice as many men than women knew the 
correct number of ballot papers to be given to voters on polling day.  
 
Table 9 
Knowledge about the Voting System (by Gender) 
(a) Q: “Who Votes for District and Tehsil Nazims and Reserved Seats for District and Tehsil 
Councils” 
   Female  Male 
Voters like Myself  39.8 %  33.4 % 
Union Nazimeen and Councilors  9.6 %  46.1 % 
Others  2.6 %  0.9 % 
Don’t Know  47.9 %  19.7 % 
(b) Knowledge about Provision of Ballot Papers  
      to Each Voter on Polling Day     
Incorrect  95.5 %  90.5 % 
Correct  4.5 %  9.5 % 
Source: Pattan (2006) Pre-election voters’ survey. Birner, Qureshi, Akramov, and Khan  1356 
3.4.  Considerations in Voting 
While the previous section dealt with the factors associated with the decision to 
vote, this section is concerned with the considerations that people who voted took into 
account when deciding for whom they should vote. Table 10 presents the descriptive 
statistics  on  the  following  question:  “Now  thinking  about  who  you  voted  for  union 
Nazim, please tell me which of the following factors were important in deciding who to 
vote for?” Multiple answers were possible. The table indicates that more than half of the 
voters in each income and gender category consider in their voting decision the plans of 
the candidate to work on issues that are important to the respondent and his or her family. 
This parameter is the best available indicator in this data set that citizens use their vote to 
exercise voice in public service provision. The table shows that next to performance-
oriented voting, identity-based voting played an important role, as well. Almost half of 
the respondents consider the ethnic or family background of the candidate important for 
their  voting  decision.  Around  70 percent  of  the  respondents  state  that  their  own 
assessment  of  the  candidate  is  important,  but  a  considerable  share  of  the  voters  also 
considered the opinions of others, including the landlord, the community and husband or 
father as important. The percentage of the very poor who pay attention to the opinion of 
landlord  and  his  political  faction  was  larger  than  that  of  the  less  poor  groups.  The 
integrity  and  honesty  of  the  candidate  was  apparently  also  important  across  income 
groups and gender. Since multiple answers were allowed, it is not possible to judge which 
of the factors listed in Table 10 were decisive for the voters. 
 
Table 10 
Considerations in Voting by Income Group and Gender 





off  Female  Male 
Personality of the candidate  75.8  89.6  89.5  81.8  91.9 
Candidate’s religious views  60.0  68.5  66.6  70.5  64.8 
Candidate’s plan to work on issues important to 
respondent and family  65.6  62.5  57.6  66.1  57.9 
Ethnic or family background of candidate  51.6  53.4  49.5  51.9  51.4 
Opinions of husband/father  66.0  59.3  55.1  84.2  42.2 
Opinion of local landlord or his political faction  43.1  38.3  27.9  36.1  33.8 
Own opinion or assessment of the candidate  71.3  78.1  80.0  70.2  82.9 
Integrity or honesty of the candidate  78.5  83.7  83.3  79.6  85.1 
Joint decision of village / neighbourhood  67.4  70.1  60.5  62.9  67.9 
The candidate/s belong to your same biradar  34.4  38.2  36.9  36.7  37.6 
The political party of the candidate  43.8  41.8  43.6  32.4  48.5 
Personal relations with candidate  52.5  64.6  62.6  47.7  71.0 
Others  100.0  100.0  88.8  85.7  96.3 
Source:  Pattan (2006) Post-election voters’ survey. 
 
3.5.  The Role of the Candidates 
Using voting to exercise voice for better service provision and for more gender 
equity  will be  more effective, if the candidates attach priority to these issues. In the 
candidate survey, 25 percent of the respondents were women. The pre-election survey of 
the candidates does not have the same poverty groups as the post-election voters survey Decentralisation for the Poor and for Women  1357 
quoted above. Therefore, reported monthly household income is used to form income 
groups,  in  spite  of  the  problem  of  missing  variables.  Two  groups  of  candidates  are 
formed: (a) candidates who reported an income of less than 3,000 Rs (16.6  percent of the 
candidates), and (b) candidates who reported a higher income. In the pre-election survey 
of the candidates, Pattan asked the question: “What are the three major local priority 
issues that you are highlighting in your election campaign?” Table 11 displays the results.  
In general, poor and non-poor as well as female and male candidates have similar 
priorities.  Expectedly,  poor  candidates  place  more  emphasis  on  poverty  reduction. 
Interestingly, this is also true for female candidates. For all candidates, street pavement, 
education and water and sanitation have a rather high priority. Rights issues, in contrast, 
are not high on the agenda. Only 1.5 percent of the male candidates mentioned women 
issues and violence against women among their three top priorities. In the case of female 
candidates, the respective figure was 8.9 percent. Expectedly poor candidates place more 
emphasis on labour rights than other categories of candidates. Health and water, which 
are often considered to be a higher priority for women, were less frequently among the 
top priorities of female candidates than of male candidates. Health was surprisingly low 
on the agenda of the low-income candidates. 
 
Table 11 
Campaign Issues Mentioned by Candidates as Priority 
Income Group  Gender   
Below 3,000*  Above 3,000*  Female  Male 
Economic Issues         
Priority Reduction  22.1  10.7  23.4  11.2 
Employment   5.2  8.4  7.8  8.7 
Inflation  2.5  0.8  2.3  0.7 
Food Security  0.3  0.5  1.2  0.4 
Government Services         
Education  34.4  40.4  4.01  39.4 
Health  16.7  28.6  25.7  28.4 
Water  20.3  36.9  28.3  35.4 
Sanitation  30.8  42.1  32.1  43.7 
Street Pavement  58.8  62.6  53.4  63.1 
Electrification  19.4  31.2  18.1  33.0 
Rights         
Women Issue/Violence Against Women  3.0  3.3  8.9  1.5 
Minority Rights  2.3  2.6  0.7  3.2 
Labour Rights  8.4  5.5  3.6  6.7 
Tenant Rights  4.0  3.0  3.1  3.7 
Governance         
Law and Order/Crime Control  5.1  5.4  2.7  6.4 
Tackling Political Corruption  0.0  1.5  0.5  2.0 
Religious Issues         
Strengthening Religion  0.0  0.3  0.0  0.6 
Other  22.8  26.0  42.2  24.4 
Source: Pattan (2006) Pre-election survey of candidates. 
*Candidates who reported a household income of more/less than Rs 3,000. Birner, Qureshi, Akramov, and Khan  1358 
Table 12 displays the educational statues of the candidates. More than half of the 
poor candidates and more than half of the female candidates who were included in the 
sample of the Pattan survey were illiterate. The overwhelming majority of the women 
candidates described themselves as housewives.  
In addition to challenges in terms of educational background, female councilors 
face  other  constraints  that  may  limit  their  possibilities  act  effectively.  Pakistan’s 
devolution laws lack provisions for the inclusion of women in budgetary committees or 
for an equal distribution of funds to male and female councilors. Moreover, the law does 
not  ensure  female  participation  as  male  relatives  of  female  councilors  continue  to 
represent them at council meetings. There are no women rights committees at the district 
level. Female candidates also have to cope with the burdens of security and mobility. In 
most parts of the country, women continue to face difficulties in moving freely in their 
constituencies. Moreover, in many areas, women councilors have to cope with the biases 
and prejudices of their male colleagues. In one instance, the male councilors in Malakand 
lodged a formal complaint against a woman member for actively participating in council 
sessions [Naz (2005), p. 57]. Security is another major problem for women councilors. 
There  have  been  instances  where  female  members  have  even  been  murdered  e.g.,  in 
Kohat, Peshawar and Abbottabad [Qureshi (2006)].  
 
Table 12 
Educational Status of Candidates 
  Income Group  Gender 
  Below 3,000*  Above 3,000*  Female  Male 
Illiterate  53.3  13.0  53.3  8.2 
Primary  25.4  12.4  15.8  14.0 
Middle  8.2  15.7  7.3  16.3 
Matric  12.0  26.7  9.7  28.8 
F.A/F.Sc  1.0  11.5  6.4  11.5 
B.A/B.Sc or more  0.0  11.6  5.1  11.3 
M.A or a Pofessional Degree  0.0  8.2  0.8  9.1 
Doctorate or Post-Doctorate  0.0  0.5  1.6  0.2 
Refused  0.0  0.5  0.0  0.5 
Source: Pattan (2006) Pre-election survey of candidates. 
*Candidates who reported a household income of more/less than Rs 3,000. 
 
4.  CONCLUSIONS 
The results indicate that there are considerable obstacles for citizens to use their 
vote  as  a  mechanism  to  exercise  demand  for  improved  service  provision  and  gender 
equity  and  to  hold  public  service  providers  accountable.  In  particular,  administrative 
barriers to voting, specifically the lack of identity cards and incomplete registration in 
election  lists  prevent  citizens  from  voting.  Poor  people  and  women  are  particularly 
affected  by  these  problems.  Moreover,  only  half  of  the  respondents  believe  that  the 
electoral  outcomes  accurately  reflect  people’s  voting  decisions.  On  the  positive  side, 
income status and residence in rural areas do not seem to discourage people from voting. 
NWFP is an exception, however. In this Province, voter turnout among the very poor was Decentralisation for the Poor and for Women  1359 
particularly low. In general, illiterate citizens and citizens from rural areas were more 
likely to vote than literate and urban citizens. Expectedly, men showed a higher voter 
turnout than women. Among the people who voted, one can observe that both identity-
based voting and performance-based voting played a role. It appears that women, very 
poor people and people in rural areas are more somewhat more inclined to use their vote 
to improve their living conditions. More than 40  percent of the very poor consider the 
opinion of the landlord and his political faction in their voting decision, which can be 
considered as an indication of the elite capture problem.  
One can expect that the prospects of low-income and of female candidates to be 
effective in reducing poverty and gender inequity will be limited due to a variety of 
constraints,  including  a  lack  of  provisions  for  their  representation  in  committees. 
Moreover, in view of the high level of illiteracy among both low-income and female 
candidates,  training  may  be  particularly  important  to  improve  their  effectiveness.  In 
conclusion, there is a need to make to improve the electoral process so that more people, 
and especially more poor people and more women, have the possibility to use their vote 
to exercise voice. There is also a need to improve the working conditions for low-income 
and for female candidates to become effective representatives of their constituencies once 
they are elected.  
The  paper  dealt  with  voting,  which  is  only  one  mechanism  by  which 
decentralisation can lead to better service provision. As the framework presented in 
the paper shows, there is a need to study voting in the context of other measures that 
improve  the  ability  of  citizens  to  demand  better  services,  such  as  social  audits. 
Moreover,  the  capacity  and  incentives  of  decentralised  government  agencies  to 
improve public service provision with a poverty and gender-focus need to be studied, 
as well. Future research may focus on explaining differences in the performance of 
local governments, taking these factors into account. Analysing different demand-
side and supply-side measures in an integrated context will hopefully help policy-
makers  and  stakeholders  to  better  understand  “what  works  where  and  why”  in 
improving local governance. 
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